Nonviolence and the strategy against terrorism

by David Cortright

In the months after 9/11, Jim Wallis challenged peace advocates to
address the threat of terrorism. "If nonviolence is to have any
credibility," he wrote, "it must answer the questions violence
purports to answer, but in a better way." Gandhian principles of
nonviolence provide a solid foundation for crafting an effective
strategy against terrorism. Nonviolence is fundamentally a means of
achieving justice and combating oppression. Gandhi demonstrated its
effectiveness in resisting racial injustice in South Africa and
winning independence for India. People-power movements have since
spread throughout the world, helping to bring down communism in
Eastern Europe and advancing democracy in Serbia, Ukraine, and beyond.
The same principles - fighting injustice while avoiding harm - can be
applied in the struggle against violent extremism.

Bush administration officials and many political leaders in Washington
view terrorism primarily through the prism of war. Kill enough
militants, they believe, and the threat will go away. The opposite
approach is more effective and less costly in lives. Some limited use
of force to apprehend militants and destroy training camps is
legitimate, but unilateral war is not. In the three years since the
invasion of Iraq, the number of major terrorist incidents in the world
has increased sharply. War itself is a form of terrorism. Using
military force to counter terrorism is like pouring gasoline on a
fire. It ignites hatred and vengeance and creates a cycle of violence
that can spin out of control. A better strategy is to take away the
fuel that sustains the fire. Only nonviolent methods can do that, by
attempting to resolve the underlying political and social factors that
give rise to armed violence.

The most urgent priority for countering terrorism, experts agree, is
multilateral law enforcement to apprehend perpetrators and prevent
future attacks. Cooperative law enforcement and intelligence sharing
among governments have proven effective in reducing the operational
capacity of terrorist networks. Governments are also cooperating to
block financing for terrorist networks and deny safe haven, travel,
and arms for terrorist militants. These efforts are fully compatible
with the principles of nonviolence.

Terrorism is fundamentally a political phenomenon, concluded the U.N.
Working Group on Terrorism in 2002. To overcome the scourge, "it is
necessary to understand its political nature as well as its basic
criminality and psychology." This means addressing legitimate
political grievances that terrorist groups exploit - such as the
Israel-Palestine dispute, repressive policies by Arab governments, and
the continuing U.S. military occupation in Iraq. These deeply-held
grievances generate widespread political frustration and bitterness in
many Arab and Muslim countries, including among people who condemn
terrorism and al Qaeda's brutal methods. As these conditions fester
and worsen, support rises for the groups that resist them. Finding
solutions to these dilemmas can help to undercut support for jihadism.
The strategy against terrorism requires undermining the social base of
extremism by driving a wedge between militants and their potential
sympathizers. The goal should be to separate militants from their
support base by resolving the political injustices that terrorists
exploit.

A nonviolent approach should not be confused with appeasement or a
defeatist justification of terrorist crimes. The point is not to
excuse criminal acts but to learn why they occur and use this
knowledge to prevent future attacks. A nonviolent strategy seeks to
reduce the appeal of militants' extremist methods by addressing
legitimate grievances and providing channels of political engagement
for those who sympathize with the declared political aims. A two-step
response is essential: determined law enforcement pressure against
terrorist criminals, and active engagement with affected communities
to resolve underlying injustices. Ethicist Michael Walzer wrote,
counterterrorism "must be aimed systematically at the terrorists
themselves, never at the people for whom the terrorists claim to be
acting." Military attacks against potential sympathizers are
counterproductive and tend to drive third parties toward militancy.
Lawful police action is by its nature more discriminating and is more
effective politically because it minimizes predictable backlash
effects.

Gandhi's political genius was in understanding the power of third
party opinion. He did not try to challenge the British militarily but
instead organized mass resistance to weaken the political legitimacy
of the Raj. The nonviolent method, Reinhold Niebuhr wrote, undermines
the authority and "moral unction" of the adversary. Gandhi realized
that political struggles are ultimately a battle for hearts and minds.
In all his campaigns, he assiduously cultivated the support of third
parties by avoiding harm to the innocent and addressing legitimate
grievances. These are essential insights for the struggle against
terrorism. The fight will not be won on the battlefield. The more it
is waged on that front, the less likely it can be won. The goal of
U.S. strategy, said the 9/11 Commission, must be "prevailing over the
ideology that contributes to Islamic terrorism." Nonviolent resistance
is the opposite of and a necessary antidote to the ideology of extreme
violence. Gandhi often said, "An eye for an eye leaves the whole world
blind." Better to keep our eyes open as we search for more effective
means of eroding support for extremism, while protecting the innocent
and bringing violent perpetrators to justice.

David Cortright is the author of Gandhi and Beyond: Nonviolence for an
Age of Terrorism (Paradigm Publishers, 2006) and co-founder of the
Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.